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It was in the fall of 1781, over four years after 
the Declaration of Independence, that General Cornwallis 
surrendered his force at Yorktown, and American indepen-
dence was realized. Yor~~town is generally supposed to 
have been the decisive battle of the American Revolution, 
but it was the naval engageme".'lt off the Vir t;i..ia Capes 
six weeks earlier, when the British fleet through a 
confusion over tactical signals, was driven away from the 
Chesapeake Bay, that actually decided the fate of the 
British forces in America. Had Adin.iral Graves taken 
advantage of his superior position when he encountered 
the Comte de Grasse, who knows how long the colonies 
would have struggled for liberty, or whether they would 
finally have been forced into submission. For it was 
only through a combination of favorable, almost provi-
dential, circumstances, that 1.'lashington, able general 
though he was, was able to gain the victory. 
In the latter part of January, 1781, Cornwallis 
was on the Catawba River in South Carolina, and Washing-
ton was on the Eudson, 700 miles av:ay, each with their 
eyes on different objectives, and with no idea that 
eight months' time would find them face to face to settle 
the question of supremacy. 
2 
Cornwallis had been sent to the Southern States by 
General Clinton to create diversions in favor of the main 
armies at New York and Philadelphia--a favorite part of 
the Commander-in-Chief's strategy. He v;as expected to 
bring the state of Horth Carolina under his subjection. 
This involved crushing General Nathaniel Greene, who 
crossed the Dan River and met Cornwallis in battle at 
Guilford Court House on March 15. T'ne British won the 
I battle, but Cownwallis losses were so great, and his 
army so weakened, that he made for the coast in order to 
1 
recover, arriving in Wilmington on the seventh of April. 
From Wilmington, Cornwallis marched up into Virginia, 
abandoning 1'Torth Carolina al together, and united at 
Petersburg vii th General Leslie. 
General Benedict Arnold, the American traitor, had 
been sent to Virginia in December of l '7 80... He landed at 
Jamestown Island on January 3 and marched immediately 
to Richmond, which he plundered, then returned down the 
James to take up a fortified position at Portsmouth. To 
oppose the British in Virginia, '1\'ashington dispatched 
Lafayette with 1,200 Light Infantry troops by land and 
1 Johnston, lienry P., "The Surrender of 
Cornwallis." Harper's, LXll, (A.ugust, 1881), p. 326. 
3 
persuaded Rochambeau to se~d some vessels from Newport 
2 
to blockade Arnold by sea. 
Des Touches, in command of the :B'rench fleet at New-
port, which had just escaped a severe gale which wrec:~ed 
three of the British squadron, et first sent only three 
vessels, a sixty-four gun ship of the line and two frigates, 
to the Chesapeake, but these were unable to reach the 
smaller British vessels, which withdrew up the C:lizabeth 
River. Arbuthnot, the British admiral, ordered some 
brigates stationed off Charleston to the spot. One of 
these, the Romulus, was captured by the French as they 
left the Bay returning to Eewport. 
On the evening of March 8 the French fleet under 
des Touches left liewport. A~buthnot, havi:i.g learned thRt 
the 3're)ch v:ere m:::: !<ins re2dy J")r sea, ~~Pd moved to the 
entra::-1ce of Gardiner's Bay, where r.is sq_ua6.ro~1 lay, and 
when, on t.te tenth, he learned. they had sailed, followed 
im.meci.iately. 3y carrying a lart:e spreud of sail, and 
because his vessels hafi cop9erea bottoms, preventing 
fouling, the British a6.miral was able to intercept des 
Touches about forty miles northeast of Cape Eenry on 
the morning of ~·~arch 16. Sach fle::t was car.nosed of 
eight s~ips of t~e line and several SDaller vessels, but 
2 Ibid. , p. 32?. 
4 
the ~ritish, having larger ships, had the edvantage of 
superior force. Eowever, des Touches, by stretegicol 
handling of his fleet, eluded ;.rbuthnot without serious 
damA.ge and returned tc, Nevlport. The British lost thirty 
killed and seventy-ttree wounded, while the French lors 
3 
was seventy-two ~illed and one hundred twelve wounded. 
Soon aft2r this eng1ge~ent, Cli~ton sent Ge~ergl 
Phillips to C~esapeate Bay witt 2,000 troops as rein-
forcements for ~rnold. ~fter landing at Lynnho.ven Bay, 
4 
the force moved.. to rortsrwuth. 
In order to cooperate witt des Touches, 1afayetLe 
had gone by forced r:~arc'.:-ies to the t.eF:d 01' the Chesapeake 
and expected there to embArk his army on the French frigates. 
Ee had already set out in advance in an open boat with 
sone other officers and. reac!1ed ·::illiam.sburg and. then 
Suffolt before he learned of des Touches' failure. Lafayette 
5 
then set out to re join ·.::ashington' s army. 'Nhen he re-
ceived news, at the head of the Elk River, of Phillips' 
expedition, he turned his army about and went to Baltimore, 
3 r.:ahan, e\. T., ~.~e.jor Otierations of the 
Iiavies in the ·,':ar of American Independence, p. 1? 0-?4. 
4 Ibid., p. 1?4. 
5 I:arper's,· loc. cit., p. 32?. 
5 
where he borrowed 2,000 pounds with which to maintain his 
army. There W8.S discontent among the troops over servins 
in the South, and several desertions occurred, but these 
stopped after Lafayette had a deserter hanged as an exam-
ple. From Baltimore he marched vii th all speed through 
Alexandria, Fredericksburg, and Bowlin.s Green, being re-
inforced by General Wayne with 1,000 troops at the North 
Anna River, and arrived in Richmond a few hours before 
Phillips made his a~pearance on the opposite side of the 
river. Phillips, sur~rised by this movement of the enemy, 
6 
retired to J amestovm Island. 
Cornwallis moved to 1.'filliamsburg June 20, where he 
received instructions from Clinton to send three thousand 
men back to New York and with the remainder to establish 
a defensive position on the coast as a buse for future 
expeditions and for the protection of naval vessels. 
Corm·1allis marched to Portsrr.outh and was pre per ing to 
embark the troops for lJew York, when later instructions 
from the Commander-in-Chief permitted him to retain 
them, and further ordered him to fortify Old Point Com-
fort. Finding, after a survey by engineers, that this 
spot could not be fortified, Cornwallis continued on to 
? 
Yorktown, which he reached late in August, 1?81. 
6 1.E.M.·' p. 32?. 
? Ibid., p. 32?-8. 
6 
Concerning this final position there has been a great 
deal of controverEy. For a defensive position Yorktown 
was a poor choice. It was completely unfortified, and 
offered retreat only by a narrow neck of land, easily 
blocked, especially by the large army and de Grasse's 
immense fleet bottling up the mouth of the Chesapeake. 
Portsmouth would have been a far better choice. Its 
proximity to Lyanhaven Bay gave immediate communication 
with naval vessels, while its position on the Elizabeth 
River would have permitted Cornwallis to retreat into 
Carolina, out of reach of the French fleet, and perhaps 
8 
dragged out the war interminably. Captain White, of 
the Royal Army, w:rw saw service with Graves against 
de Grasse, contends that Cornwallis was forced to take 
up this "sickly, untenable" position against his own 
g 
expressed judgement. Clinton later said his orders 
to occupy were discretionary, and that he never re-
ceived a hint from Cornwallis that the place was unte-
nable until after his surrender. Cornwallis maintained 
that he had occupied Yorktown in v:hat he believed was 
the spirit of his superior's orders, and because he 
thought that in an emergency he would be relieved by 
10 
Clinton and the British fleet. In any case, the 
8 White, Naval Researches, p. 5?. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Harper's, loc. cit., :p. 328. 
7 
choice was an extremely unfortunate one, as later events 
showed. 
Lafayette, mear1while, had e;onc to 'Nillia.msburg and 
11 
from there constantly watched CornwAllis' movements. 
Washington, encamped on the liudson River, where he 
was contemplating an attack on ~fow York, received from 
Admiral the Comte de Grasse an announcement that he 
would be in the Chesapeake about the fjrst of September. 
This news reached Viashington on August 14. He immecl.i-
ately concentrated his attention on a descent on Corn-
wallis. His plan met tl1e approval of the French commander, 
Rochambeau, and they began operations with the greatest 
secrecy. ·1'iashington first made a fei:-·1t toward New York, 
then turning south, repeated this ruse from r!ew Jersey, in 
order to preve~t Clinton from learning of the intended 
campaign in Virginia. From new Jersey General ','lashington 
headed directly for the Chesapea}:e. On September 2 the 
2,000 troops under his command, 4,000 hsving been left in 
Eev: York, marched through Philadelphia, followed the next 
day by the French army. In that city they received news 
of de Grasse's arrival in the Chesapeake with a strong 
fleet. Thus encouraged, Washington pushed on toward his 
goal. At Baltimore he embarked his troops for the James 
11.Iill., p. 32'7. 
8 
River, and joined forces with Lafayette at Vlilliamsburg, 
so that by September 2? the combined army was ready to 
12 
move on the British. 
When Clinton finally realized the fact that Washington 
had given. him the slip at New York, the only way he saw of 
meeting the danger to Cornwallis was to attempt to go to 
13 
bis relief by sea. But lack of certain information re-
' garding ~he strength and movements of de Grasse s fleet 
handicapped the British in this endeavor. 
Arbuthnot had sailed on July 2 for England, leaving 
Admiral Graves at Hew York in cofil!'.llB.nd of the British naval 
forces. Graves wrote Rodney, then in the '.','est Indies, that 
intercepted dispatches of the enemy disclosed a large 
squadron from the Vlest Indies was to arrive on the American 
coast during the summer, to operate in conjunction with 
the French fleet at Newport. On July ? Rodney sent the 
sloop Swallow to New York with word that if he sent re-
inforcements, they would be headed for the Virginia 
Capes and thence to New York. He asked for cruisers to 
be stationed along the coast with information. Rodney 
was misled to believe that de Grasse had only fourteen 
ships. of the line. On August 10 Rear Admiral :aood sailed 
from Antigua with fourteen ships of the line, bound for 
121E.!£.., pp. 329-332. 
13 Ibid., p. 330. 
9 
the Chesapea~e Capes. He had previously dispatched the 
brig Active to New York with notification of his departure. 
Meantime, the Swallow had arrived in New York on July 2?, 
only to find. Graves had left for Boston Bay. She was sent 
on, but meeting enemy vessels, was forced ashore on Long 
Island and lost. The Active was captured before she reached 
New York. Thus, Graves was uninformed of the pending crisis, 
and continued cruising until the sixteenth of August, when 
he returned to Sandy Hook. Here he found a duplicate of 
the Swallow letter, but it told him only the course a re-
inforcement would take; not that Hood had already departed. 
Eood, arriving 01'f the Chesapeake on August 25, sent a 
copy of the Active's message, but these hardly preceded his 
own arrival on August 28. The same evening intelligence 
was received in New York to the effect that de Barras had 
left Newport with his whole division, bound for the Capes. 
tood, therefore, a~chored outside S~ndy Hook, where Graves, 
who was the senior Admiral, soon joined him. On the thirty-
first the entire fleet of nineteen ships or the line, as 
well as several smaller vessels, set sail for the Chesa-
peake, where it was understood that the French fleet and 
the combined armies of Washington and Rochambeau were 
14 \bound. 
14 !1!ahon, pp. 176-8. 
10 
The British, by reqso::-1 of their i;iacc ura te inf or ma tion, 
expected that de Grasse's fleet would ?robably be inferior, 
15 
Gnd certainly not superior, to their own. 'rllus, if Graves 
could a ttacl<: de Grasse before he united with the Rhode Is-
land squadron of eight s.dps 01' the line anu. severr:l frigates, 
it was natural to suppose that he could effectuall~,- upset 
the French and American plan of a combined a ttacl'. by land and 
16 
sea on the British forces at Yorktown. 
De Grasse had left Cap Francois on August 5 with 3,300 
French troops and twenty-eight ships of the line. He an-
chored in Lynnhaven Bay on the thirtieth of the month and 
instantly landed the troops, which joined Lafayette, 
raising his force, then the only one opposing Cornwallis, 
to 8,000 men. At the same ti ~e '! 1ashington was on his way 
south vii th 6, 000 regulars. The French cruisers took a 
-position in the James River to prevent Cor11wallis from 
crossing it and escapi _g into Carolina. Other vessels were 
sent to close the mouth of the York. 3y these detachments 
17 
the main fleet was reduced to twenty-four sail of the line. 
On the fifth of September, de Grasse was anchored in 
Lynnhaven Bay, watering his ships before proceeding up the 
15 White , p • 35 • 
16 Ibid. 
17 Mahon, pp. 178-9. 
11 
channel formed by the Horseshoe sands and the shoals of 
the Middle-ground, at the upper entrance of which he planned 
to anchor his fleet, in order to prevent the British from 
interfering with the operation of the American and French 
armies. This be intended to do as soon as he was joined by 
the squadron from Rhode Island under de Barras, consisting 
of eight ships of the line and four frigates, expected at 
18 
any moment. 
At eight o'clock on the morning of the fifth, a 1!,rench 
look-out frigate cruising off Cape H~nry sighted a fleet 
making for the Middle-ground. The vessels were at first 
thought to be de Barras' squadron. The size of the fle3t, 
however, soon convinced the French that it was British. 
The boats were recalled, and preparation made to weigh 
anchor as soon as the tide bagan to ebb, without which 
19 
they could not work out of the bay. 
The fleet under Graves was approaching the mouth 
of the Be.Y under a favorable wind when at 9: 30 the 
Sodebay, advance ship of the British, signalled that 
she had sighted a fleet, which from the oblique angle 
from which it was seen, appeared as if it were stretched 
18 ~.vhi te , p. 40 
19 Mahon, p. 1?9. 
White, p. 40. 
12 
across the entrance to the Bay. Actually the French were 
anchored as close to Lynnhaven Bay as their draft permitted. 
The tide began to ebb at noon, and the French vessels began 
to tack around Cape Henry. Some of the advance ships were 
able to clear the Cape without making more than one tack, 
but the innermost had to make several. Graves had mean-
while formed his fleet on an east and west line heading 
for the entrance. As the French cleared, they formed a 
line as quickly as they could. The van, however, clearing 
the Cape first, was some distance ahead of the rest of the 
fleet. Here Graves lost his first golden opportunity to 
~trike a decisive blow. With the advantage of his wind-
ward position, he could have swept down and destroyed these 
vessels before they were in position, and while they wer3 
unsupported by the remainder of the fleet, and thus made 
the two fleets numerically equal, while still holding the 
20 
superior position. So fixed in his mind, ho~ever, was 
the traditional line-of-battle formation of the British 
Navy that he failed to give the signal to engage the 
enemy until the two fleets were drawn up in parallel 
21 
lines facing each other. 
By 2: 00 p:• . .m. the French rear squadron had gotten 
clear of the Horseshoe and was fairly well formed on the 
20 Vlhi te, pp. 40-1. 
21 Mahon, p. 1?9. 
13 
south side of the Middle-ground, and the whole line was 
22 
making out of the Bay. The French were at this time 
approximately three miles from the British line, with 
23 
their van abreast of the British center. The two fleets 
were on opposite tacks; the British, on the starboard 
tack, were headed for the Middle-ground, while the French 
were standing out to sea. ,\t 2:13 'P• m. Graves gave the 
signal for his fleet to wear together, bringing both 
fleets on the same tack. Hood's division was now the 
rear, and Rear Admiral Drake's the van. J.fter wearing 
around, the fleet stopped by bri~ging to the wind in 
order to permit the enemy center to come obreast of the 
British center. The two lines were by this time nearly 
parallel, but the smaller British fleet did not extend 
with the French rear, which was not yet clear of the 
Cape. At 2:30 Graves signalled for the van to fill and 
bear away ty.ro points; that is, to beer away from the 
Wind and head more toward the enemy, instead of sailing 
parallel to their line. Each vessel then followed the 
van ship, so that the British line formed an angle with 
that of the French. The signal to bear away was later 
24 
repeated twice, so that the angle became more marked. 
22 '/.'hi te, 'P. 42. 
23 l.Iahon, pp. 179-80. 
24 ·.·:hi te, p. 42. 
!.Iahon, p. 180. 
14 
This was another serious blu:ider on Graves' part, for v.i th 
the British on an angle to tte enemy line, seve·;. ships of 
the rear division were never able to get close enough to 
go into action; a fatal mistake for an inferior force at-
25 
tempting to attack. 
At 3:46 the signal was hoisted for the ships to close 
to one cable's length (720 feet) apart, and for Hood's 
division to make more sail. This was almost immediately 
followed by the signal for close action, to bear down 
and engage the enemy, but the signal for the line was still 
flying. The two signals were thus contradictory. About 
four o'clock the headmost ships of Drake's division began 
to engage the enemy's van, ~hich was separated from the 
26 
center and rear. Here was another opportunity for Graves 
to cut off the French van and destroy it. Had the center 
gone to the support of the van, the French van could have 
27 
been cut to pieces, but again Graves failed as a leader. 
De Grasse, in order to protect his van, as well as to 
decoy the British away from the entrance to the Bay, so 
that de Barras could enter, signalled for his van to bear 
away and take up a new position more to leewaru, where 
they were at long shot range from the enemy. Graves again 
25 Mahon, .P· 80. 
26 White, p. 42. 
Mahon, p. 80. 
2 7 James , William :.a1 burn, T'ne British 
avy in Adversity, p. 299. 
15 
made the signal for his von to haul more to starboard; 
i.e., toward the enemy. As they ran down to renew the 
battle, the French were able to coolly direct their fire 
28 
at them. The signal for the line was hauled down briefly 
after four o'clock, but was soon hoisted again, because 
29 
the ships were too close together. The London, Graves' 
flagship, luffed up in order to bring her broadside to 
bear, but this brought the ship next ahead of her on her 
weather beam, which meant that the other ship would have 
30 
to fire over the London to get at the enemy. 
At 5:30 the signal for the line was again hauled 
down on the London, the close action flag still being 
up. At this time Hood finally bore down with his divi-
sion, but the French also bore away, and he was unable 
to engage them. VJhen he bore up to engage the enemy close, 
the signal for the line was again rehoisted, and he had 
to retake his position in the line, though the signal for 
31 
close action was still flying. 
Shortly after sunset the firing ceased. The British 
losses were 90 killed and 246 wounded. The French losses 
are given only in round numbers: about two hundred killed 
28 ~hite, p. 43. 
29 Mahon, pp. 180-81. 
30 Ibid., p. 181. 
31 'i'.'hi te , pp.. 44-5. 
32 
and wounded. 
16 
The two fleets continued all the next day in sieht 
of each other, repairing damages. The British vessels 
had suffered gr'2atly a loft, al thoueh their batteries were 
intact. The Terrible later had to be burned to prevent 
33 
capture. Graves at first tliought to renew the action, 
but with his fleet so crippled, he did not do so. Late 
on the ninth of September the French fleet disappeared 
34 
under a great cloud of sail, bound for the Chesapeake. 
De Barras reached the Bay on the tenth, and was joined 
there by de Grasse on the eleventh, making a combined 
fleet of 36 ships of the line on the side of the Ameri-
35 
cans opposing Cornwallis. 
On t:r..e tenth Graves fleet stood toward the Chesa-
pea~e, with a frigate going ahead to reconnoitre. Early 
on the thirteenth the look-out reported the French moored 
above the Horseshoe i: ... the bay. '.';hen esked by Graves for 
an opinion of what to do, Hood replied that he knew "not 
what to do in the truly lamentable state to which we have 
brought ourselves." Graves tl-.e n returned to New York, 
36 
arriving at Sandy Eook on SepteDber 19. 
32 ~ahon, p. 181. 
33 Ibid. , pp. 183-4. 
34 Ibid., p. 183. 
35 Ibid. , p •. 184. 
36 Ibid. 
18 
with colors cased, filed between the ranks of American 
and French soldiers, their band, ordered not to play an 
American or French tune, playing "The 'Norld Turned Up-
40 
side Down." 
40 Haroer's, p. 334. 
l? 
Cornwallis was now encircled by the largest fleet 
that had ever filled the Chesapeake and the largest and 
finest army Washi!lgton had ever commanded. The British 
earthworks were unable to resist the artillery fire, and 
their own guns were insufficient to return it. On Octo-
ber l? Cornwallis made an attempt at retreating across 
the York River with whe. t was left of his able-bodied 
troops. Part of the force .bad gotten to Gloucester when 
a sudden gale arose, preventing the boats from returning 
until it was too late. The enemy had realized his in-
tention, and taking advantage of the confusion, were 
37 
able to force surrender. The British general's mili-
tary chest by this time contained only 1,800 pounds, 
which sum the French commissioners at the parleys did 
not condescend to notice, until "urged to do so by their 
38 
more sordid allies." The British troops amounted to 
only 4, 017 men fit for service, while 'Nashington had 
39 
a force of 21,000. 
On the nineteenth of October, 1?81, Cornwallis 
surrendered to General '.'!ashington, as the British troops, 
3? White, pp. 62-3. 
38 Ibid., p. 58. 
39 Ibid. , p. 63. 
18 
with colors cased, filed between the ranks of American 
a~d French soldiers, their band, ordered not to play an 
American or French tune, playing ''The 'Norld Turned Up-
40 
side Down." 
40 Haroer's, p. 334. 
I'EY TO PL.\ 'IS OF TEE CIIESAPEAEE 
From 1.Vhi te: N9.val Researches, p. ?2 
A. The position of the French fleet at anchor 
BB. T:ce British fleet at 2:30 p. m., the van bearing 
down in succession 
F. The French fleet, the centre and rear edging away 
C. The I.!iddle-ground 
D. The Eorseshoe sand 
E:S. The "strong position," according to writer in the 
?olitical ~aeazine for the British fleet to have 
anchored in 
GGG. The position taken up by :French fleet after the 
action 
E. York spit; 19 miles from Yorktown 
JJ. Position of French fleet at anchor, accordi~g to 
0. 
R. 
?.:r. Clerk and Rear _\d.I:dral Ekris, on morning of 
September 5 
:'orfolk in ruins 
T-'ortsmouth 
Old Point Comfort 
Hampton Roads 
IJ. B. Tl1e ver ia ti on of the compass was 1° westerl 
and. the ebb tide bega:. to flla~e at noon. The Plate woul 
not admit of t:_e four head.most :?rench ships being inclt: 
in it, but tteir positions I:lBY be easily imagined. 
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